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Abstract. The increasing penetration of wind generation in power systems to fulfil the 
ambitious European targets will make wind power producers to play an even more important 
role in the future power system. Wind power producers are being incentivized to participate in 
reserve markets to increase their revenue, since currently wind turbine/farm technologies allow 
them to provide ancillary services. Thus, wind power producers are to develop offering 
strategies for participation in both energy and reserve markets, accounting for market rules, 
while ensuring optimal revenue. We consider a proportional offering strategy to optimally 
decide upon participation in both markets by maximizing expected revenue from day-ahead 
decisions while accounting for estimated regulation costs for failing to provide the services. An 
evaluation of considering the same proportional splitting of energy and reserve in both day-
ahead and balancing market is performed. A set of numerical examples illustrate the behavior 
of such strategy. An important conclusion is that the optimal split of the available wind power 
between energy and reserve strongly depends upon prices and penalties on both market trading 
floors. 
1.  Introduction 
In last two decades electricity markets have been evolving in different ways with the aim to improve 
the competition among the different players without compromising the required reliability and stability 
in the electric system. In this scope, electricity markets are composed by different market stages for 
different commodities. Besides the energy commodity traded in energy auctions, there are ancillary 
services commodities (usually traded in reserve markets) that are used by power system operators to 
ensure proper levels of reliability, stability and security in the power system. 
With the continuous introduction of wind generation in the electricity market, the behavior of 
electricity market participants has been changing. Currently, multiple methodologies for optimizing 
the strategic behavior of wind power producers (WPP) in the energy market have been proposed, 
accounting for expected costs from the balancing market [1–8]. Part of this work has been conducted 
based on the assumption that the strategic behavior of wind power plants does not have a significant 
impact on the market equilibrium, thereby, assuming price-taker behavior, i.e. the WPP does not exert 
market power [1–5]. In an opposite direction, several works exist, claiming that WPP may have a 
significant impact in the market equilibrium, and somehow may exert market power – yielding a price-
maker assumption [6–8]. 
Nevertheless, wind power generators are now able to provide ancillary services, such as frequency 
and voltage control [9]. Namely, wind power plants can control active power injection in a few 
seconds; injecting/consuming reactive power while maintaining proper voltage levels, as well as 
providing virtual inertia to the system [10–12]. Thus, new business models may emerge, stimulating 
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the willingness of wind power producers to participate and take advantage of reserve markets to 
increase their profit, as detailed in [13–15]. A analytical approach based on probabilistic forecast for 
wind power participating in the energy and reserve market is proposed in [13,14]. In [13], a simplistic 
strategy for splitting the available wind power in energy and reserve is applied, while [14] uses two 
different control strategies (proportional and constant wind power control) for WPP to participate in 
both energy and reserve markets. 
We place ourselves under the proportional control strategy used in [14], contributing with a new 
stochastic methodology that maximizes the expected revenue of the WPPs in the day-ahead energy 
market and in the reserve market, while accounting for expected costs from failing to provide the 
energy and reserve products at the balancing stage. Besides that, this work contributes with a new 
perspective of facing the lead time of the WPP between the day-ahead and balancing stage by 
considering that energy and reserve bids submitted in the day-ahead market by the WPPs can be 
changed in the balancing market, i.e. the use of more accurate forecast of the wind power production 
in the balancing stage reduces the deviation between the power production committed in day-ahead 
stage and the effective production during the energy delivery. This may allow WPPs to bid in both 
market stages with more precise information about their wind power production, thereby, reducing 
expected energy and reserve costs in the balancing market. The results show that allowing a change in 
the proportionality of energy and reserve between day-ahead and balancing market, improves the 
expected revenues of the WPP, as well as, reduces the expected power deviation between the day-
ahead and the energy delivery. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the market structure for wind power 
producers participating in energy and reserve markets. Section 3 presents the detailed mathematical 
formulation of the optimal offering strategy for wind power producers. Section 4 numerically 
evaluates the offering strategy in expectation under different prices and penalties schemes that may 
occur in the market. Section 5 assembles the most important conclusions. 
2.  Wind power in electricity markets 
2.1.  Day-ahead and balancing participation 
Currently, wind power producers can participate in the wholesale market by submitting their power 
bids (usually, their expected production) in the day-ahead market. The uncertainty of the wind power 
production is usually mitigated through the balancing market (the last mechanism for correcting the 
system and market participant imbalances), where the deviations of the wind power producers (the 
difference between their day-ahead market bids and the expected power production close to real-time) 
may induce some penalties for the wind power producers by failing to provide their day-ahead bids 
(either in deficit or surplus of power production) [16,17]. 
In that context, the expected costs to the wind power producers depend on the energy imbalance of 
the power system and of the difference between the sell and the delivered energy by the WPP. 
Furthermore, two different penalty mechanisms (one-price settlement and two-price settlement) can be 
applied depending on the characteristics and of the market rules [18,19]. For instance, the two-price 
system is assumed in the balancing mechanism in Denmark [20]. 
In what concerns the price bids of wind power plants in the day-ahead market, usually, WPPs 
places their power bids in the market at zero price or even negative price. This behavior depends on 
the internal rules of each market, as well as, on the different incentive schemes that wind power 
producers are submitted in each country. For instance, in Denmark, wind power producers are 
remunerated based on a scheme that lies on a combination of market participation (negative prices are 
allowed in NordPool) plus a premium [14]. In Portugal, similar schemes have been followed, yet most 
of wind power producers are still under fixed feed-in tariffs [21]. Besides, the Iberian market does not 
allow for negative bids [22,23]. 
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2.2.  Energy and reserve markets model 
WPPs are willing to provide some ancillary services, since in their perspective, providing reserve 
(even with uncertainty and under high penalties when failing to provide the service) can somehow 
increase their revenue. Thus, the development of a methodology for wind power participation in 
energy and reserve markets at the day-ahead market, while accounting with expected costs in the 
balancing market is proposed and illustrated in Figure 1. The energy and reserve markets assume 
different characteristics, so different considerations are taken. On the one hand, wind energy bids 
submitted in the day-ahead market should account for potential imbalance situations and their 
asymmetric penalties. On the other hand, bids submitted in the reserve market should take into account 
the possibility to fail in providing the service. 
Nevertheless, this model allows WPPs to submit bids into the energy and reserve market at day-
ahead stage, following a proportional strategy for the split of the available power into energy and 
reserve (a share parameter is obtained by the split between energy and reserve). The bidding strategy 
for the day-ahead market assumes an expected energy market price, while the reserve market 
participation strategy takes into account the capacity reserve price. 
At the balancing stage, expected costs for energy and reserve deviations are considered. On the one 
hand, expected costs for energy surplus or deficit of the WPP are considered. In contrast, reserve costs 
are only accounted for deficit of reserve, since the reserve surplus is not detrimental to the system. 
Additionally, this models assumes that the share parameter (split between energy and reserve) at the 
balancing stage can assume a different value from the one used for the day-ahead market decision. 
Thus, WPPs have the opportunity to reduce some energy or reserve deviations, thereby, increasing its 
expected revenue. 
 
 
Figure 1. Wind power participation model in the energy and reserve market. 
2.3.  Wind power control to provide energy and reserve 
Currently, wind power plants have developed several ways of active power control to provide energy 
and reserve, thereby, ensuring the stability of the power system. The use of these controls has been 
required by the system operators in different countries with high penetration of wind power, thereby, 
updating the grid-codes with new active power controls methodologies. System operators may require 
the use of such controls in cases of excess of wind power, to decrease congestion or even just for 
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reserve provision. In this context, four methods for active power control of wind power for providing 
energy and reserve are described in detail. 
2.3.1.  Proportional wind control. This control mechanism consists in the proportional split of the 
available active power in energy and reserve, as illustrated in Figure 2. In terms of market strategy, the 
proportional wind offering strategy is used to define the share of energy Ec and reserve Pc to be 
submitted in the market [14,24], where Q is the total power bid and αc the strategy parameter 
controlling the share of energy and reserve bids at day-ahead stage, which varies between 0 and 1. 
 
Figure 2. Proportional wind offering 
strategy (reproduced with authorization 
from [24]). The blue line Q stands for the 
available wind power production, while 
the red curve 𝐸𝑐 comprises the energy part 
of Q to offer in the energy market. The 
reserve bid 𝑃𝑐 to offer in the reserve 
market is equal to area between the blue 
and red curve. 𝛼𝑐 is the proportional share 
parameter that splits the available wind 
power into energy and reserve assuming a 
value between 0 and 1. 
 
2.3.2.  Constant wind control. The constant wind power consists in a constant curtailment of energy in 
case that the expected forecast is bigger than a specified level of wind power (Figure 3) [14,24]. The 
strategy, reserves a fixed amount of power reserve to face system imbalances. The remaining active 
power is dispatched for the energy service. In this control, wind power plant has a fixed amount of 
power reserve for ancillary services, when the wind power available is above of a certain percentage 
X% of the installed wind power. Otherwise, the available wind power is offered to the energy market. 
 
Figure 3. Constant wind 
offering strategy (reproduced 
with authorization from 
[24]). The blue line Q stands 
for the available wind power 
production, while the red 
curve 𝐸𝑐 is the remaining 
part of Q to offer in the 
energy market assuming a 
certain fixed amount of 
reserve 𝑃𝑐. 
2.3.3.  ΔP control. This control is similar to the constant wind power control. The control curtails a 
certain and fixed amount of the maximum available power in function of the system operator 
requirements [15,25,26]. The biggest difference between the ΔP control and the constant control is the 
use of a minimum threshold (X% of the installed wind power) in the constant control to allocate part 
of the available wind power as power reserve. 
2.3.4.  Output cap. The output cap is an active power control for wind turbines establishing a 
maximum level of active power that can be provided to the energy service [15]. In cases of the 
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available wind power higher than the output cap, the power that exceeds the output cap is curtailed by 
the wind turbine. Thus, system operator can require low levels of output cap to decrease the variability 
of the wind power production. However in the WPP standpoint, this control most likely reserves a 
significant part of the available energy to power reserve, which may result in a small but somehow 
constant provision of the energy service. 
3.  Wind offering methodology 
3.1.  General optimization framework 
A methodology for the optimal offering of a WPP in energy and reserve markets at the day-ahead 
stage, while accounting for the expected penalties in the balancing market is proposed. A two-stage 
stochastic approach is used to optimize the revenue R for a given WPP, and is expressed as 
*
* * *
, ,c w
cap c sp
w w w w
Q
w
Maximize R P E T W
 
  

       (1) 
where λcap is the capacity price for primary reserve allocation, Pc is the reserve contracted (offered) in 
the day-ahead market, λsp is the spot price, Ew
*  is the delivered energy in scenario w, Tw
*  is the 
regulation costs from the regulation market, and Ww
*  is the penalty cost for wind power plant failing to 
provide the scheduled reserve. 
Additionally, it is assumed that the WPP acts as a price-taker. Thus, the market prices and penalties 
are independent of the WPP production. Then, the regulation costs from the regulation market can be 
defined as 
 
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*, * *
*
*, * *
, 0
, 0
c c
w w
w
c c
w w
E E E E
T
E E E E




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 
   
 (2) 
where (Ew
* - Ec) is the difference between the delivered energy Ew
*  and the amount of energy offered at 
day-ahead market Ec. The variables λ* ,+ and λ* ,– are the regulation unit costs for positive and negative 
deviations, respectively, 
*, ,
*, ,
sp c
c sp
  
  
 
 
 
 
 (3) 
where λc ,+ is the unit down-regulation price for being long, while λc ,– is the up-regulation price for 
being short. In addition, a two-price settlement rule (as in NordPool) is assumed [1]. Thus, when the 
power system imbalance is negative, there is a need for downward regulation (energy surplus), which 
is given by 
,
,
c sp
c sp
 
 




 (4) 
On the other hand, when the power system imbalance is positive, there is a need for upward 
regulation so the prices and penalties hold that 
,
,
c sp
c sp
 
 




 (5) 
The penalty costs for reserve imbalance is given by 
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 (6) 
where (Pw
* - Pc) is the reserve power imbalance between the deployed level of reserve Pw
*  in real-time 
and the reserve offered, λbpt ,+ is a unit penalty when wind producer generates more power than the 
contracted (surplus), and λbpt ,– is the unit penalty cost when the WPP generate less than contracted. 
These are given by 
, ,
, ,
bpt cap pt
bpt pt cap
  
  
 
 
 
 
 (7) 
hence λpt ,+=0 since (extra) positive reserve is not detrimental to the system’s reliability. λpt ,– is the 
penalty for negative reserve imbalance, weighted by the probability that reserve is needed. 
3.2.  Proportional wind offering strategy 
In this work and by simplicity, the proportional wind offering strategy is applied for splitting the 
available wind power for energy and reserve, as illustrated in Figure 2. The objective function is 
subject to the following constraints regarding the proportional strategy split of energy and reserve. The 
proportional wind offering strategy is used to define the share of energy Ec and reserve Pc to be 
submitted in the market [14,24]. 
c cE Q  (8) 
(1 )c cP Q   (9) 
max1 Q E   (10) 
Under some support schemes, the WPPs are required to participate in the day-ahead market, 
thereby, the bounds of the total power bid Q reflects the minimum power bid to participate in the 
market (1 MW in most of electricity markets) and the installed capacity of the WPP. 
Equations (11) and (12) concerns the wind offering strategy under the balancing power market 
* * ,obsw w wE E w    (11) 
* *(1 ) ,obsw w wP E w     (12) 
where Ew
obs donates the eventually observed wind power production, composed by energy Ew
*  and 
reserve Pw
* share actually available. αw
*  is the strategy parameter for the splitting in real-time operation. 
3.3.  Fixed and relaxed approach of wind strategic split in day-ahead and balancing market 
Under the fixed approach (problem with “non-anticipativity” constraints), it is assumed that the share 
of energy and reserve established in the balancing stage cannot be different from the day-ahead stage. 
This ensures that perfect information on real-time cannot be used to change the share of energy and 
reserve decided on the first-stage problem, thereby avoiding the decision process to play with full 
degree of freedom. Equation (13) represents the “non-anticipativity” constraint of the wind offering 
problem. 
* ,cw w     (13) 
On the other hand, a simplification of the proportional strategy in the stochastic problem can be 
performed, assuming that the wind power producer can change the share of energy and reserve in both 
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day-ahead and balancing stages (relaxed approach). This means that the wind power producer can 
adjust the share of energy and reserve in real-time, accordingly with the expected power production in 
each scenario w. Thus, the WPP can improve their revenue by changing their bid according with better 
information of their production when closer to real-time operation. The mathematical formulation for 
that case relies on equations (1) to (12). 
The wind power producer problem presented here has been modelled as two-stage stochastic 
approach in GAMS [27] modelling language and carried out with CONOPT [28] as a NLP solver on 
an Intel Core i5 2.70 GHz processor with 8 GB RAM. 
4.  Evaluation of offering strategies 
A wind power plant with 15 MW of installed power is considered. The wind total bid offer is 
subjected to a minimum amount of power to participate in the markets. Currently, electricity markets 
settle 1 MW as the minimum power for the bidding process. A set of 100 wind power scenarios for a 
single period presented in [29], has been considered for evaluating the proposed methodology. It is 
assumed that all the scenarios have equal probability. 
The evaluation of the proposed strategy is performed according with a set of prices and penalty 
costs combination allowing us to test the behavior of the strategy for different assumptions, such as 
αw
* =αc and allowing that αw
*  can be free (i.e., αw
*  can be equal or different of αc) – stochastic approach 
with and without “non-anticipativity” constraint. 
4.1.  Normal operation 
Under normal operation in the electricity market, adequate price signals for wind participate in both 
energy and reserve markets should be ensured. In this scope, the capacity price in the day-ahead 
market should be higher than the spot price (λcap ≥ λsp). Besides that, the reserve penalties in the 
balancing stage for failing to provide the bid offered in the day-ahead stage should be higher than the 
penalty for failing to provide the energy (λbpt ,− ≥ λ* ,−), since for the power system is much worse a 
unit failing to provide reserve rather than energy. 
Thus, the prices for energy and reserve, and the unit penalty costs for up and down deviations 
under normal operation for the power system (our base case) are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Prices and penalty costs in energy and reserve market for base 
case. 
Energy Price (€/MWh) Reserve Price (€/MW) 
λsp 40 λcap 41 
λc ,+ 30 λbpt ,+ 0 
λc ,- 50 λpt ,- 96 
Under the normal operation case, it is expected that both strategies may behave differently, since 
the allocation of the available energy to one of the markets is not straightforward. One can expect the 
strategy with fixed share parameter base their decision with the information available in the day-ahead 
stage, while the approach with the flexible share parameter may use the better information of the 
balancing stage to reduce expected costs. Figure 4 illustrates the energy market participation for both 
stochastic approaches with standard and flexible share parameter relationships between day-ahead and 
balancing market. The standard approach chooses to participate only in the energy market, since the 
gain from participating in the reserve market is not much higher than participating in energy-only, and 
account with a high penalty when failing to provide the offered power reserve (risk adverse behavior). 
In contrast, the flexible approach (without “non-anticipativity” constraint) presents a different 
behavior (closer to the risk neutral), since participating in both energy and reserve markets. The 
participation in both energy and reserve can in one way give flexibility to the wind power producer to 
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increase the expected revenue while taking the risk of getting penalties from failing to provide energy 
and reserve. Thus, for lower levels of available wind power (until wind available power equal to P
c
, as 
can be seen in Figure 5) it is allocated all the available power to the reserve market (E
*
=0, in Figure 4), 
where the penalty for failing is higher. 
 
Figure 4. Energy bid in the day-ahead (E
c
) and balancing stage (E
*
) for 
both approaches under the normal operation case. 
The reserve bids in day-ahead and balancing stage for both strategies are shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Reserve bid in the day-ahead (P
c
) and balancing stage (P
*
) for 
both approaches under the normal operation case. 
Moreover, the expected revenue that the WPPs may achieve by participating in energy and reserve 
market with different behavior of the share between energy and reserve in day-ahead and balancing 
market is 387 € and 395 €, respectively. In this case, the opportunity to change the energy and reserve 
share in the balancing market improves the revenue of the WPPs about 2%.  
4.2.  Special operation – single market participation 
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In cases of occur different schemes of prices and penalties, the participation in the market behaves 
differently, as expected. For instance, in cases where the capacity price is higher than the spot price 
(λcap ≥ λsp) and the reserve penalty lower than the energy penalty (λbpt ,− ≤ λ* ,−), both strategies fully 
offers in the reserve only market. In this case, make total sense to offer only in the reserve market 
since there is no gain on participating in the energy market. 
On the opposite case, when the capacity price is lower than the spot price (λcap ≤ λsp) and the 
reserve penalty is higher than the energy penalty (λbpt ,− ≥ λ* ,−), both strategies assumes the same 
behavior by participating in the energy only market. One can notice that participating in the energy 
market will results in higher revenues in the day-ahead market and less expected costs in the balancing 
stage. 
Both special cases implies a logical participation in a single market, however, these cases are 
unlikely to happen in future electricity markets with competitive integration of wind power generation 
in the reserve market. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
With the introduction of new business models where the WPPs can provide energy and reserve bids in 
the day-ahead market while accounting for the expected cost from the balancing market, new strategic 
bidding for WPPs is crucial to increase their profit. 
This work presents two ways for WPPs to submit their bids in the energy and reserve markets 
based on the assumption of WPP behaving as a price-taker. One of the approaches considers fixed 
share of energy and reserve in the stochastic general problem, i.e. the share parameter in both day-
ahead and balancing stages remains the same. The other approach sets the share parameter to be free 
between the day-ahead and balancing stages. Although the strategy with flexible share parameter can 
increase the revenue of the WPP, this requires a certain level of perfect information of the balancing 
stage, since the “non-anticipativity” constraint between first and second stage of the problem is not 
applicable in this case. However, this strategy allows the WPP to change their bids in the market when 
getting close to the market closure gate, where information of its available production is more reliable.  
Notwithstanding, future electricity market may face some changes on this topic, since new 
behavior and market opportunities for WPPs may influence the market design and mechanisms 
specially in reserve markets. On the one hand, system operators can require some guarantees from the 
WPPs, controlling somehow the level of uncertainty in the reserve product and maintaining proper 
levels of system reliability. On the other hand, market operators must develop mechanisms to ensure a 
fair participation of all type of market participants in both energy and reserve products and avoiding 
market power. Pushing decisions close to real-time is of the most interest of WPPs, since it will 
improve the quality of their decisions and to some extent reduce the lead time effect between the day-
ahead decisions and the energy and services delivered. 
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